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A trusted platform refers to a platform of the type championed by the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG). That is, a trusted platform is “one which
will behave in a particular manner for a specific purpose”1. Trusted Com-
puting refers to the collection of interrelated and interoperating technologies,
which, when combined, help to establish a more secure operating environ-
ment on commodity platforms. A fully-realised Trusted Computing platform
will allow users to reason about the behaviour of a platform, as well as pro-
viding standardised mechanisms to protect sensitive data against software
attack. Based on these capabilities, Trusted Computing has been proposed
as a means of enhancing the security of numerous applications. For exam-
ple, it has been promoted as an adjunct to the digital signature process,
to enable secure software download, to support secure single sign-on solu-
tions, to secure peer-to-peer networks, to improve the security and privacy
of biometric user authentication, to harden mobile devices, and to facilitate
identity management. A number of authors have also considered trusting
computing’s applicability to the agent paradigm, grid security, e-commerce
transaction security, and to defend against the ever-growing threat posed by
crimeware.
Despite its many potential beneficial applications, Trusted Computing
is not without its detractors. Privacy concerns relating to trusted plat-
forms have been raised. The extent to which Trusted Computing could be
used to enable and enforce digital rights management, and, more generally,
the possible expropriation of platform owner control, are contentious issues.
Concerns have also been expressed that Trusted Computing could be used
to support censorship, stifle competition between software vendors, facilitate
software lock-in, and hinder the deployment and use of open source software,
thereby potentially enabling market monopolisation by certain vendors.
1www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
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Our aim in this article is not to engage in this debate, but rather to
highlight some of the key challenges that we believe need to be addressed in
order to accelerate the widespread adoption of Trusted Computing. Topics
addressed include issues with setting up and maintaining the PKI required
to support the full set of Trusted Computing functionality, the practical
use and verification of attestation evidence, and backwards compatibility,
usability and compliance issues.
2 Trusted Computing Technologies
Trusted computing relies on the successful integration and interoperation of
a number of technologies:
• Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), as specified by the TCG, are mi-
crocontrollers with cryptographic coprocessor capabilities. A TPM
provides a platform with the following features: special purpose reg-
isters called Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) in which infor-
mation characterising the host platform’s configuration can be stored;
a means of reporting the platform’s current configuration to remote
entities; secure volatile and non-volatile memory; random number gen-
eration; a SHA-1 hashing engine; and asymmetric key generation, en-
cryption and digital signature capabilities.
• A platform’s Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) enables its con-
figuration to be reliably recorded.
• Isolation technologies, such as Microsoft’s Next Generation Secure
Computing Base (NGSCB) or Citrix’s XEN, take advantage of CPU
and chipset extensions incorporated in a new generation of processor
hardware, including Intel’s TXT and AMD’s AMD-V. They enable
the unhindered execution of software through the provision of assured
memory space separation between processes.
The ability to reason about platform behaviour and to protect senstive
data are both reliant upon the concept of an integrity measurement, namely
the cryptographic digest (or hash) of a platform software component2. How-
ever, in isolation, individual measurements of software components may be
of little interest. To reason effectively about the behaviour of a particular
platform component, the entire sequence of events that culminated in the
execution of that component must be measured. For example, during an
authenticated boot process, initiated by the RTM, a platform’s entire config-
uration is reliably captured and stored. During this process, the integrity of
2For example, the integrity measurement of a program could be calculated by comput-
ing the cryptographic digest or hash of its instruction sequence, its initial state (i.e. the
executable file) and its input.
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a pre-defined set of platform components is measured. These measurements
are condensed to form a set of integrity metrics which are then stored in
the TPM’s PCRs. These integrity metrics can be communicated to external
entities for examination and verification, via a process called attestation.
In order to protect sensitive data against software attack, the data can
be associated with a set of integrity metrics representing a particular plat-
form configuration and/or a password, and then encrypted. A TPM then
ensures that protected data can only be decrypted and released for use if the
correct password is input and/or the current configuration of the platform
matches the integrity metrics sealed with the data. The protection of sensi-
tive data is further enhanced through the deployment of isolated execution
environments.
3 Public Key Infrastructure and Trusted Comput-
ing
The development of any functional PKI requires a sophisticated combination
of organisational, policy-oriented, procedural, and legislative approaches.
Indeed the challenges and pitfalls of PKI deployment are well-documented
[2, 4], and high-profile system and protocol failures blamed on inappropriate
deployment of PKI abound, with SET providing one of the most prominent
examples. Put simply, providing a PKI is hard.
The majority of Trusted Computing services depend fundamentally on
the deployment and successful inter-operation of certain PKI elements. We
refer to this collection of components as a Trusted Computing PKI (TC-
PKI), although it is actually a larger and more complex ‘eco-system’ of
elements than would normally be contained in a single PKI. Figure 1 depicts
the main types of CA in a TC-PKI.
For a platform to be considered trusted, it must first obtain the following
core credentials from an endorsement CA, a platform CA, and one or more
conformance CAs, respectively.
An endorsement credential: Each TPM is associated with a unique asym-
metric encryption key pair called an Endorsement Key (EK) pair. An
endorsement credential binds the public component of this key pair
to a TPM description and vouches that a TPM is genuine. The en-
dorsement CA is typically the TPM manufacturer, with the binding
taking the form of a digital signature created using a signing key of
the manufacturer.
A platform credential: A platform credential asserts that a TPM has
been correctly incorporated into a design conforming to the TCG spec-
ifications. The platform CA is typically the platform manufacturer. In
order to create a platform credential, the platform CA must examine
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the endorsement credential, the conformance credentials relevant to
the trusted platform, and the platform to be certified.
One or more conformance credentials: Conformance credentials vouch
that a particular type of TPM and associated components (such as a
RTM and the connection of the RTM and TPM to a motherboard)
conform to the TCG specifications. Conformance CAs must be enti-
ties with sufficient credibility to evaluate platforms containing TPMs,
and are typically conformance testing facilities.
Together, CAs of these three types are responsible for issuing the core
trusted platform credentials. However, in order to address privacy concerns
resulting from routine use of an EK, the TCG introduced the ability for a
TPM to generate and use an arbitrary number of pseudonyms, in the form
of Attestation Identity Key (AIK) pairs. In order for a relying party to have
assurance that an AIK represents a trusted platform, a platform must obtain
an AIK certificate from a mutually trusted third party. Two approaches to
AIK certification have been proposed by the TCG.
In the first approach, a trusted third party, referred to as a Privacy-
Certification Authority (P-CA), verifies a trusted platform’s core credential
set and provides assurance that an AIK is bound to a genuine trusted plat-
form in the form of an AIK credential. However, this approach has attracted
a certain amount of criticism, as a P-CA is capable of linking all the AIK
credentials it issues to a specific platform via the EK, putting the P-CA in
a position where it is able to defeat the anonymity protection provided by
the use of AIKs.
The second approach, Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA), was in-
troduced to counteract this criticism. DAA requires a DAA CA, which can
produce an anonymous DAA credential for a trusted platform, which in turn
can be used by the platform to sign AIK credentials. Using this approach,
trusted platforms can generate and use AIKs which cannot be easily linked
to a particular EK by any third party.
Yet another class of CA has been introduced to attest to the usage, mo-
bility and authorisation constraints associated with private keys held by a
TPM. A Subject Key Attestation Evidence (SKAE) CA is responsible for
issuing X.509 certificates which allow a verifier to ascertain that an opera-
tion involving a private key can only be performed within a TCG-compliant
TPM environment. Such a certificate can be used as a means of coping with
difficulties in integrating TPM-controlled keys with standard security proto-
cols. Recently, further PKI-related authorities (notably Migration Author-
ities and Migration Selection Authorities) have been introduced to address
issues with key migration between TPM-enabled platforms.
A TC-PKI not only involves a plurality of CAs, but also a series of
implicit dependencies amongst these CAs. In a TC-PKI, a platform CA
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relies on the due diligence of an endorsement CA and one or more con-
formance CAs in accrediting components of a trusted platform. Similarly,
both privacy-CAs and DAA CAs rely on platform CAs, endorsement CAs
and one or more conformance CAs. Furthermore, SKAE CAs rely on the
due diligence of Privacy CAs or DAA CAs in evaluating the accreditation
evidence provided by a trusted platform.
Traditionally, Certificate Policies (CPs) (which specify what a certificate
should be used for, and the liability assumed by the CA for this use) and
Certification Practice Statements (CPSs) (which specify the practices that
a CA employs to manage the certificates it issues) are deployed by CAs in
order to define and limit their liabilities to relying parties. CPs and CPSs
are, in fact, an essential component in building a successful PKI, since they
give a relying party (which could be an end-user or another CA) a means
to manage the business risk in pursuing a particular PKI-related course of
action. In the past, uncertainty as to where liability lies has driven up the
cost of many PKI implementations [4]. In the absence of CPs and CPSs,
implicit cross-certification may exist between CAs, which, as noted in [2],
implies that CAs are equally trusted. In such a setting the security of a
certificate is reduced to that of the least trustworthy CA. Unfortunately,
CPs and CPSs are notoriously difficult and costly to create, and so their
production may act as a barrier to entities wishing to provide CA services.
In the setting of a TC-PKI, such policy statements must be produced
by every CA upon which another CA may depend. Currently, these de-
pendencies are only informally defined, and, as a result, there is no clear
indication of where any liability will lie. Further, at the time of writing, we
are not aware of any TC-specific CPs or CPSs having been created. The
picture is further complicated by the fact that all the CAs in a TC-PKI
rely (at least to some extent) on the endorsement CA. Therefore, the point
in a TPM’s life-cycle at which an EK credential is acquired impacts on a
platform’s ability to obtain platform, AIK, DAA and SKAE credentials. In
early normative EK credential acquisition, as defined by the TCG, a TPM
manufacturer generates the EK credential. However, in post-manufacturing
generation, a platform owner is responsible for generating the EK creden-
tial. In this instance, the certifying body may not be recognised by other
CAs and, as a result, the certified TPM host platform may not be able to
obtain further credentials from entities outside the domain of its EK cre-
dential issuer. In practice, this may not be an issue, as it seems likely that
non-manufacturer supplied EK credentials will not be widely used.
In summary, Trusted Computing relies on an as yet largely unavailable
and unspecified PKI in which multiple CAs (possibly existing in different
organisational, procedural and/or jurisdictional domains) are expected to
inter-operate. This may pose a significant challenge to the future success of
this technology.
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Figure 1: Trusted Computing PKI Components
4 Credential and TPM Revocation
The revocation of credentials within a TC-PKI may introduce further prob-
lems. Given the complex dependencies between many of the TC-PKI cre-
dentials, the compromise of an individual key and the subsequent revocation
of its associated public key certificate will result in a cascading revocation
of all dependent TPM credentials. For example, in the event of endorse-
ment key revocation, every AIK associated with the revoked EK must also
be revoked. In addition, all SKAE certificates associated with the newly
revoked AIKs must also be revoked. This implies that multiple CAs, po-
tentially in independent domains, must be contacted in a timely manner
and informed about a revocation decision. This may be a time-consuming
and costly endeavour. Further complexity is introduced when attempting to
revoke a DAA credential associated with a compromised Endorsement Key
pair, because, by design, a DAA CA cannot link a platform’s EK pair with
a DAA credential.
We next consider revocation of a TPM itself (rather than revocation of
its credentials). For cost reasons, the level of tamper-resistance provided by
TPMs is likely to be limited. Moreover, the objective of the mechanisms
specified by the TCG is the prevention of information asset compromise
through software attack. That is, the software security of the platform is
predicated upon the notion that the TPM will maintain an accurate and
reliable record of all platform events. Such a focus means that the security
of the underlying hardware is assumed, and that there is no purely technical
driver to promote the development of tamper-resistant TPMs.
Yet it is clear from the example of widespread gaming console modifica-
tion that, given sufficient incentive, users will actively circumvent hardware-
enforced security. In this context, recent demonstrations of a relatively un-
sophisticated hardware attack [8] through which a TPM’s PCRs can be reset
without rebooting a platform, would appear to pose a significant challenge
to Trusted Computing. The ability to reset PCRs effectively destroys the
evidence upon which a remote verifier relies to assess a platform. Once this
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evidence is destroyed, the PCRs can in theory be repopulated with what-
ever data the platform owner wishes, allowing the owner to misrepresent
their platform’s current configuration in a manner that is convincing to a
remote verifier. The simple attack of [8] underlines the need for any veri-
fier to consider the “quality” of the platform when assessing the state of a
trusted platform. That is, an attestation from a platform incorporating a
well-designed TPM from a known manufacturer should be considered more
convincing than an attestation from a platform incorporating a TPM from
an unknown or disreputable supplier.
Given the above discussion, it is reasonable to assume that, before long,
TPMs will be compromised and all credentials and keys extracted. These
could then be used to emulate a TPM in software in a way that is indistin-
guishable from the true hardware TPM. The process by which a compro-
mised TPM is detected will largely be reliant on that TPM’s interactions
with P-CAs, DAA CAs and SKAE CAs. It has been suggested [1] that TPM
compromise could manifest itself through an excessive number of certifica-
tion requests originating from a single TPM host platform (where ‘excessive’
is to be determined by a risk-management policy). However, this approach
to detection itself introduces a number of challenges:
• CAs may specify different thresholds for determining what is meant
by ‘excessive’, potentially leading to a high number of false positives
for CAs with low thresholds.
• Once a compromised TPM has been detected, this information needs
to be globally propagated to prevent the compromised TPM host plat-
form from being (mis)used elsewhere. This requires the establishment
of a global revocation infrastructure. Such an infrastructure could be
implemented using Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) or through an
On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). Neither option, however,
is ideal. In the case of CRLs, there are concerns regarding CRL dis-
covery and timely issuance of revocation information. In the case of
OCSP, in order to make its deployment economically viable, CAs typ-
ically charge for each revocation check. It is unclear who would pay
for such a service in a TC-PKI. In the case of an OCSP request for an
SKAE certificate, the verifier would need to contact the SKAE CA,
which would need to contact the AIK CA, which in turn would need
to contact the platform, endorsement and conformance CAs.
• A CA must consider potential legal issues that might result from the
wrongful issuance of revocation statements damaging a platform’s abil-
ity to interact with other parts of the infrastructure. As a result, CAs
may be reluctant to announce suspected compromises.
• To alleviate the risk of a malicious P-CA issuing falsified revocation
statements, a means by which the credibility of CAs in issuing such
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statements can be assessed is needed. It is currently unclear what form
such a mechanism might take.
5 Attestation Evidence Gathering and Verification
The exact parameters to be considered when performing integrity measure-
ments on platform components have yet to be standardised. At a minimum,
the parameters must be chosen so that each software component’s integrity
measurement can be uniquely identified. These measurements must also
remain consistent to allow ease of verification. However, in the absence
of standardisation, platform integrity measurements may fail to capture all
the elements required by the verifier of a platform component. This is es-
pecially true when one considers the complications introduced by software
which relies on dynamically linked libraries. In this case, a proportion of
the platform component’s code base may not be measured, as it will not be
loaded by the application prior to execution.
Moreover, given the extensible nature of modern computing systems, the
number of components that might need to be measured by a TPM is rapidly
increasing. As a result, each PCR will have to store multiple measurements.
As the number of platform components increases, so does the complexity of
third party verification of attestation statements. It also becomes difficult
for a challenger to verify a single component running on a platform.
The introduction of isolation technologies enables a platform to be par-
titioned into isolated execution environments, thereby (potentially) simpli-
fying attestation statement verification. In this case, a challenger of the
platform may be satisfied to verify measurements pertaining to rudimentary
platform components, such as the boot software, the isolation layer and soft-
ware components running in an isolated execution environment rather than
verify all software running on the platform. This may ease the platform
attestation problem in some situations.
However, even assuming the number of platform component integrity
measurements that a challenger must verify is limited, problems will still
arise from platform component updates and patching. Given current soft-
ware development practices, frequent patching of OS components and ap-
plications can be expected to be the norm for the foreseeable future. But
even the order in which patches are applied can result in a combinatorial
explosion of distinct configurations for a single application, each configura-
tion requiring a distinct reference value for attestation purposes. Frequent
patching may also lead to problems with sealed data. If an update or patch
is applied to a software component to which a key or data is sealed, this
key or data must be unsealed and resealed to the updated software com-
ponent measurements. Failure to do so will result in the key or data being
inaccessible after the patch has been applied.
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Property Based Attestation [6] has been proposed to address the problem
of managing attestation in the presence of a multitude of possible configura-
tions and system updates. This approach introduces an additional layer of
indirection into the attestation and sealing processes. Instead of expecting a
verifier to determine if a particular set of PCR values represent a trustwor-
thy software state, a platform’s state is certified (by a trusted third party) as
satisfying certain properties. A platform is then capable of attesting that its
current configuration possesses such a property, allowing a verifier to infer
whether a platform is trustworthy or not without knowing which particular
software is running. Property Based Attestation also allows data or keys to
be sealed to properties. As long as the properties of the updated platform
configuration match those of the prior configuration, problems related to
patching may be reduced.
Unfortunately, Property Based Attestation only succeeds in shifting the
problems with attestation to an entity other than the verifier, with all of
the original problems persisting for the entity that needs to verify a PCR-
based attestation. Moreover, a software component satisfying a particular
property is by no means guaranteed to still satisfy that property after it
has been patched, without rerunning the (potentially expensive) evaluation
procedure. Such an evaluation procedure may contribute to the marginal-
isation of minority platforms, since the cost of establishing that a given
platform state matches some desirable property may be so great that only a
few well-funded organisations are able to obtain such a result. Also, exactly
what properties can be satisfied using such an approach remains an open
question. More positively, Property Based Attestation at least shifts the
problems to an expert specialising in the particular business of attestation.
With this approach, the number of entities needing to verify such complex
attestations could be significantly reduced, and these entities could be given
additional resources to enable them to complete their task.
A final potential limitation of platform attestation is that of user ob-
servable verification. McCune et al. [3] describe a scenario in which a user’s
platform has become infected with malware. Despite the fact that this in-
fection can be detected by an external entity during an attestation process,
the external entity has no way of reliably informing the end user that they
have failed their attestation. Malware may simply modify the user’s dis-
play, resulting in the user believing their platform to be in an acceptable
state, and, because of this, going on to disclose sensitive information to the
malware.
6 Backward Compatibility
As a consequence of the piecemeal roll-out of Trusted Computing technolo-
gies, current trusted platforms do not come equipped with fully-integrated
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RTMs, isolation technologies, processors or chipset extensions. Instead, cur-
rent trusted platforms include only a TPM and, with the exception of Infi-
neon TPMs, do not even include endorsement credentials. To the best of our
knowledge, all currently available platforms lack both conformance creden-
tials and platform credentials. This situation has the potential to create an
awkward backward compatibility issue as and when fully-deployed TC-PKIs
become available. In particular, the absence of these credentials will make
it difficult, if not impossible, for a platform to later acquire AIK credentials
without operating at reduced assurance levels.
The absence of RTMs, isolation technologies, processors and chipset ex-
tensions from current TPM-enabled platforms makes the use of much of the
TPM Trusted Computing functionality described in Section 2 essentially
unreliable. Techniques such as sealing and attestation are unworkable if the
host platform’s configuration cannot be reliably measured. In order to later
enable these features on an already deployed platform, measurement func-
tionality (in the form of a RTM and modified operating system) would need
to be integrated into the platform. This would require the installation of
a new OS and the BIOS to be flashed, tasks that would prove difficult for
the average user. On the other hand, this may be feasible in a corporate
environment with centralised administrative control of platforms. Indeed,
in such deployments, legacy hardware issues may be less serious because of
more rapid retirement of platforms. Moreover, software-based isolation en-
vironments can be provided through the installation of additional software
on already deployed platforms. Nevertheless, hardware-based isolation, en-
abled through the processor and chipset extensions, cannot be retrofitted to
platforms already in the field. As a result, first generation trusted platforms
can never be adequately upgraded to provide all the services associated with
a trusted platform.
7 Usability
Prevailing wisdom suggests that it is prudent to hide the complexities of
security technology from end-users. In the past, applications that have relied
on a PKI have failed in cases where security functions have been too unwieldy
to be usable by non-experts. In one example [7], the PKI experience was
considered so painful by some users that they refused to use the technology
if it involved handling certificates. The design of suitable user-interfaces
that can communicate rich security information whilst remaining usable has
historically been very difficult to achieve [9].
By contrast, using a TPM currently requires a detailed understanding of
how the underlying technology works. For example, the very act of enabling
a TPM prior to its use is a non-trivial task requiring a user to understand and
edit BIOS settings. Once enabled, a user is further confronted with setting
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a TPM owner password, selecting key types fit for purpose, and enrolling
certain keys within a PKI. Further problems may arise from password use
and management. In addition to setting a password for TPM ownership,
unique passwords may also be associated with protected data or keys in a
TPM. While the deployment of numerous passwords may be viewed as a
sound security decision, management of such passwords so that access is not
jeopardised may prove problematic.
These usability issues are a reflection of the general immaturity of Trusted
Computing technology and the associated marketplace. Whilst a huge effort
has been put into the design and specification of technical aspects of Trusted
Computing by the TCG, so far it seems that less work seems to have been
done to address user-centric issues. We may hope for user-friendly config-
uration and management tools in future, although even these may not be
sufficient to make Trusted Computing accessible to the masses.
8 Non-Compliance and Inter-operability
Through the provision of a set of open standards, Trusted Computing spec-
ifies security interfaces which allow heterogeneous devices to interact. Un-
fortunately, many of the additional technological building blocks required
to instantiate a trusted platform are not standardised, nor does the TCG
dictate implementation specifics to its adopters. As a result, a number of
currently available TPMs do not comply with the TPM specifications [5].
The current absence of conformance testing facilities implies that the pro-
duction of non-compliant TPMs may very well continue for the foreseeable
future. In turn, discrepancies in implementation between TPM manufactur-
ers may limit future inter-operability between different trusted platforms.
9 Conclusions
Trusted Computing is undoubtedly a powerful technology, with a huge range
of possible applications. Nevertheless, there remain a number of significant
obstacles to its widespread use, as we have discussed here. Addressing these
challenges is therefore a high priority for future research.
Perhaps the most significant of these obstacles is the deployment and
management of the PKI necessary to enable general use of the security ser-
vices supported by Trusted Computing. These issues are in many ways sim-
ilar to those which prevented the establishment of a global general-purpose
PKI. Nevertheless, deploying domain and company-specific PKIs to support
Trusted Computing in particular, well-defined environments would appear
relatively straightforward, since the majority of the problems simply disap-
pear — this again reflects the experience of deploying conventional PKIs,
which have been used very successfully in specific domains.
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We have also examined problems arising with the use and interpretation
of evidence generated using Trusted Computing functionality. This prob-
lem arises in particular because of the number of different components (and
versions of components). As with the PKI issues, many of the problems are
particularly serious when one considers universal use of Trusted Computing
— the issues are likely to be much less serious in a closed/managed environ-
ment, e.g. as established within a large organisation, notably because the
number of components will be significantly less, and there are likely to be
more resources available to evaluate the components.
In conclusion, many challenges to the successful large-scale use of Trusted
Computing remain. Nevertheless, these challenges are likely to be much less
serious for a very important class of users, namely corporate IT. Providing
the full benefits of Trusted Computing to the widest possible audience is a
major challenge for future research.
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